The British Army And The Operational Level Of War (1989) By J. J. G. MacKenzie and Brian Holden Reid
 
Should deterrence fail, is the British Army prepared to successfully fight a conventional war? Many senior military figures have argued strongly that the answer is 'no'. The British and indeed most Western armed forces have traditionally not been very good at understanding the important relationship between technology and military doctrine and this surely is the key to the future. The impact that this has on preparation for war is profound and until recently, has not been addressed by the British Army.
 
The Russians have always, on the other hand, had an established military doctrine that enables them to marshal their forces not only into the most effective military machine ever, but one which can predict and adapt to changing circumstances. The main reason for this is their devotion to the operational level of war that area between strategy and tactics which denotes the fighting of battles in a given theatre of operations in pursuit of the political objective of the war.
 
In the first of several path-breaking books, The British Army and the Operational Level of War presents the thinking, of those officers who will be in charge, on what it is the Western armed forces must do to respond to the future challenge. The work contained herein results from the First Higher Command and Staff Course held at Staff College, Camberley, January Much 1988. The object of the course was to prepare these selected senior officers for command of field formations and operational staff appointments in national and international headquarters. What is presented here is not only substantial evidence of the revival in the British Army of serious thinking about conventional warfare, but a snap-shot of those issues currently receiving priority in British military thinking.
 
Hard Cover
233 pages
In Good condition