Nuclear Deterrence Strategies & In A Regional Context (1995) By Dean Wilkening, Kenneth Watman
 
2 books in set
 
U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies (106 pages)
This report assesses the requirements of a deterrence strategy for application to potential regional adversaries. The authors argue that states content with their status quo (e.g., the former Soviet Union during the Cold War) should be relatively easy to deter, especially from seeking gain, because they are likely to be risk-averse decisionmakers. On the other hand, many regional adversaries, already dissatisfied with the status quo and anticipating further losses, can be hard to deter, though not impossible. Hence, the U.S. military problem of regional deterrence in this instance boils down to two factors: (1) how the United States can make its deterrent threats highly credible; and (2) what military capabilities are required for credible denial and punishment threats. Should an adversary be willing to take high risks, the authors suggest that the United States adopt a national military strategy based on the ability to deny the opponent's political/military objective, either by basing U.S. forces within the region in times of crisis or by convincing the adversary that they can be forward deployed rapidly if the need arises.
 
Nuclear Deterrence In A Regional Context (75 Pages)
This report addresses the question of deterring nuclear attacks by regional adversaries against the United States, U.S. forces overseas, or U.S. allies. Because emerging nuclear states will have small arsenals at first, regional nuclear threats will be made primarily for three political purposes, to: (1) deter the U.S. from intervening in a regional conflict, (2) intimidate U.S. regional allies; and/or (3) ensure the survival of their state or regime. Effective U.S. deterrent strategies vary depending on the purpose behind the nuclear threat. A U.S. strategy of "escalation dominance" should credibly deter nuclear threats against the U.S. homeland or U.S. forces overseas when the adversary's objective is to prevent U.S. intervention. A U.S. strategy of extended deterrence based on escalation dominance, backed up by theater defenses, should prevent U.S. regional allies from being intimidated by an adversary's nuclear threats. For the third threat, which is the most difficult to deter, U.S. strategy should shift away from retaliatory deterrence to highly effective damage limitation (i.e., counterforce capabilities backed up by effective defenses).
 
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